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We consider the situation where two agents try to solve each their own task in a common
environment. In particular, we study simple sequential Bayesian games with unlimited
time horizon where two players share a visible scene, but where the tasks (termed assign-
ments) of the players are private information. We present an inﬂuence diagram framework
for representing simple type of games, where each player holds private information. The
framework is used to model the analysis depth and time horizon of the opponent and to
determine an optimal policy under various assumptions on analysis depth of the opponent.
Not surprisingly, the framework turns out to have severe complexity problems even in sim-
ple scenarios due to the size of the relevant past. We propose two approaches for approx-
imation. One approach is to use Limited Memory Inﬂuence Diagrams (LIMIDs) in which we
convert the inﬂuence diagram into a set of Bayesian networks and perform single policy
update. The other approach is information enhancement, where it is assumed that the oppo-
nent in a few moves will know your assignment. Empirical results are presented using a
simple board game.
 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
It is a central problem in Multi-agent research to model the reasoning necessary when multiple agents, each with indi-
vidual objectives, interact in the same environment. While each agent may change the state of the environment towards a
more favorable state for itself, other agent’s actions may change the state to a less favorable state. When planning under such
conditions it is beneﬁcial to take into account the other agent’s reasoning. The Recursive Modeling Method (RMM) which
was proposed by Gmytrasiewicz et al. [1] does that. They propose to equip each intelligent agent with a model in which each
agent is equipped with a model which models the other agents. These nested models may again have models of all the rest of
the agents in the environment which again contain nested models. The nesting of models continues until a predeﬁned nest-
ing level is met. At the deepest level the nesting is ended by a simpler kind of model which equip each agent in the envi-
ronment with a ‘‘ﬂat” model, without models of other agents.
We shall use RMM together with Inﬂuence Diagrams (IDs) for modeling a game scenario. In this scenario each agent in-
tends to solve a task or assignment by taking certain actions, which change the state of a common environment. The char-
acteristics of the scenario is that since the agents co-exist in the same environment, the actions performed by one agent
affects the state of the scenario for all agents. The state of the environment will be known by all agents, but the assignments
are private knowledge. The scenario may be a competition between the agents, they may cooperate in solving the same task
or they may be working on solving each their own task without caring about the other agent’s performance. No matter what,
the success for each agent is highly dependent on its ability to model the other agents in the scenario.. All rights reserved.
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due to the no-forgetting assumption (the assumption that everything that has been known is remembered). When looking
into the future, the decision maker has to consider way too many possible future information scenarios, all relevant for the
current decision. The information to consider is the variables that will be instantiated in the future. Lauritzen and Nilsson [3]
propose Limited Memory Inﬂuence Diagrams (LIMIDs) in which the decision maker is assumed to remember only a subset of
the instantiated variables. This means that the decision maker assumes in the future to know less than actually will be the
case. We call this approach information reduction.
Another approach is to assume to know more. For the kind of games we study, the player may assume that at some point
in the future he will know his opponent’s assignment. If so, all other past information is irrelevant. That is, he assumes that
he will know more than actually will be the case. We call this approach information enhancement.
In this paper, we will exploit both approaches for calculating approximations to optimal strategies, and we report on a
series of experiments with game scenarios where the solution of the resulting inﬂuence diagrams is intractable.2. Background
We consider games with the following characteristics. The scene is visible to all players. Each player has a set of actions,
which have an effect on the state of the scene. The players act concurrently. Each player gets a pay-off, which is a function of
the state of the scene. In case of zero-sum games, the actual gain/loss is the difference between the two pay-off functions.
The pay-off function is known only to the player. We call the pay-off function the assignment of the player, and the assign-
ment of the players do not change during the game. We assume everything to be ﬁnite (scene, actions, assignments). In this
paper, we consider games with only two players. We shall call this kind of games Simple Sequential Bayesian Games (SSBG).
Formally, an SSBG consists of two players P1, P2 and a world W with a ﬁnite set of states w1;w2; . . . ;wm. We assume P
1 to
be female and P2 to be male. The players have ﬁnite sets of moves,M1 andM2, which affectW. The transition between world
states at time t to time t þ 1 is determined by a probabilistic function s, where s : W M1 M2 W ! R, where
sðw1;m1;m2;w2Þ is the probability of Wtþ1 being in state w2 given that Wt was in state w1 and the two players making
the moves m1 and m2, respectively.
Furthermore, each player has an assignment, which is a particular pay-off function reﬂected in utility numbers over states
of the world. Thus, players P1 and P2 have a ﬁnite set of possible assignments A1 and A2, respectively. The structure of the
game and the world state is always known by both players, but the actual assignment of the other player remains hidden.
However, a probability distribution of the opponent’s assignment may be inferred by observing the changes of the world and
through Bayesian inversion inferring a distribution of his/her moves. The pay-off function, which assigns pay-offs to each
player at each time step, is a function of the current world state and the actual assignments.
2.1. Inﬂuence diagrams
We shall use the classical paradigms from Probabilistic Graphical Models (PGMs). A PGM is a directed acyclic graph with
three types of nodes, chance nodes (circular nodes), decision nodes (rectangular nodes), and utility nodes (diamond shaped
nodes). A directed link into a chance node reﬂects (causal) impact, which may be of non-deterministic character, a link into
a decision node represents information. That is, if C is a parent of the decision node D then the state of C is known by the
decision maker when D is to be decided.
The quantitative part of a PGM consists of utility functions and conditional probabilities. For a utility node Uwith parents
paðUÞ we specify the utility as a function of paðUÞ. For a chance node C with parents paðCÞ we specify PðCjpaðCÞÞ, the condi-
tional probability distribution of C given paðCÞ.
A PGM is an inﬂuence diagram (ID), if the utility nodes have no children and there is a directed path comprising all decision
nodes. For an inﬂuence diagram we assume no-forgetting: the agent remembers everything from the past.
A solution to an ID is an optimal strategy: a strategy consists of a set of policies, one for each decision node. A policy, dD, for a
decision node D is a function, which given the known past provides a decision. A strategy is optimal if it maximizes the deci-
sion maker’s expected utility.
There are standard algorithms for solving IDs, and systems for specifying and solving IDs are commercially available [4–
7]. We shall in this paper take these algorithms for granted.
The framework of IDs has been extended in various ways. In particular, Koller and Milch [8] introduced Multi-Agent Inﬂu-
ence Diagrams (MAIDs), where the various acting agents are given decision and utility nodes of particular colors (or shad-
ings). We shall use the MAID framework to represent the game scenario, and we address solution by converting the
representation to a series of IDs.
2.2. The curse of time horizon
You may consider the solution of an inﬂuence diagram in the following way. Assume that you are confronted with an ID
with three decisions D1;D2, and D3. Before deciding Di you observe Oi. When you are about to decide D3, you know the states
of O1;D1;O2;D2, and O3, and you can rather easily compute the optimal decision. On the other hand, when you are about to
N. Søndberg-Jeppesen, F.V. Jensen / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51 (2010) 587–599 589decide D1 you need to know how you will act in the future, and right now you do not know the states of O2;D2, and O3. That
is, you need a tractable representation of the policy dD3 with domain ðO1;D1;O2;D2;O3Þ. The curse of time horizon is the prob-
lem that the domain of policies for future decisions grows exponentially with time and very fast become intractable. The
problem is not that you cannot cope with the last decision; the problem is that you cannot compute the ﬁrst decision be-
cause you do not have tractable representations of policies for future decisions. If you are so lucky that sufﬁciently many
variables are irrelevant for the future decisions [9,?], the domain of the policy functions may have tractable size. If not,
you may doom some variables irrelevant by assuming that you will not remember their states. This will give a so called LI-
MID [3]. A LIMID provides an approximate representation of future policies.
There are other ways of approximating policies of future decisions. The main approach is to extract the information from
the past into a smaller set of variables.
When dealing with PGM representations of games, you will be hit by the curse of time horizon, and much of the present
paper is a report on various ways of coping with it.3. Graphical representation of SSBGs
We adapt the framework of MAIDs to SSBGs. This is illustrated in Fig. 1. In Fig. 1 player P1’s nodes are lightly shaded, and
P2’s nodes are darkly shaded.
The nodes W0;W1; . . . represent the world states at t ¼ 0; t ¼ 1; . . . the chance nodes A1 and A2 represent the players’
assignments, the nodes with Mi-labels represent the moves by player Pi. The diamond shaped nodes, which are half lightly
shaded and half darkly shaded represent the pay-off functions, which assign a utility to both players in each game step. The
links from a W-node and the A-nodes to a U-node indicate that the utility is a function of the world state and the assign-
ments. The links from the A1-node to decision nodes represent that player P1 knows her assignment. The links fromW-nodes
to decision nodes represent that the state of the world is always known. The dots at the right of the graph indicate that there
is no time limit speciﬁed.
There might be constraints on which assignments the players can have simultaneously. For example, they might not have
the same assignment. Therefore, A1 and A2 are connected to a constraint node, which is instantiated.
At t ¼ 0 the game starts inW0, where P1 and P2 each decide their moves concurrently knowing only their own assignment
and the initial world state. P1’s and P2’s joint moves lead to a new state W1, where player P
1 and P2 again decide each their
moves knowing W0;W1 and their own assignment and ﬁrst move. When both players have decided their moves, the game
continues with the next time step.
Even if there is a pre-speciﬁed time horizon, the standard methods for solving IDs [4–6] cannot be used. Consider the last
time step. Both players have to come up with an optimal decision given the past. Part of the considerations for player P1 will
be an estimate of player P2’s move. However, P2’s move is dependent on an estimate of P1’s move. You end up with an inﬁnite
regression, which in game theory is solved by determining Nash equilibria [11]: a pair of policies for which each policy is
optimal given that the other player uses the other policy.
3.1. The game seen in the eyes of P1
In real world situations, players do not perform an inﬁnite regression and determine Nash equilibria. The players will ana-
lyze the situation to a certain depth and with a certain look-ahead of moves, and in the depth analysis they will make someFig. 1. A MAID representation of SSBG.
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and we will incorporate RMM into the models by letting P1 bound the recursive modeling to a certain level. More speciﬁcally,
P1 has a model incorporating the moves of player P2, where she makes some assumptions on how many moves ahead he
analyzes the situation, and in turn, how deep P2 is assuming P1’s model to be. In other words, if P1 makes these assumptions
about the policies of P2, the model in Fig. 1 can be transformed to an ID, where P2’s decision nodes are replaced by chance
nodes, and PðM2iþ1jA2;W0; . . . ;Wi;M20; . . . ;M2i Þ is the policy (see Fig. 2). Note that the node A2 reﬂects that P2’s assignment is
unknown to P1. The model shall include prior probabilities for A2.
In the simplest case P1 assumes that P2 just picks a move randomly. We will say that this player has a level 0 model since
she in this case does the least effort to model P2. In case P1 assumes that P2 has a level 0 model, we say that P1 has a level 1
model. In general, when P1 has a level i model, she assumes that P2 has a level i 1 model.
At each level, P1 may take different numbers of future time steps into account. If P1 is only taking one future time step into
account she will greedily pick a move that maximizes her expected utility in the next time step. If P1 is taking two future
time steps into account she will maximize the sum of her expected utility in the next and the following time step. In general,
if P1 is taking h future time steps into account she will maximize her expected sum of utility in the next h time steps. We
shall call the number of future time steps taken into account the time horizon of P1. Consequently, P1 also must have an
assumption about P2’s time horizon and she must also have an assumption about which time horizon P2 assumes that P1
has etc.
In order to capture P1’s modeling level and time horizon together with her assumptions about P2’s nesting depth and P2’s
assumptions about P1’s nesting depth we give the following deﬁnition (inspired by [12]).
Deﬁnition 1 (Player Representation). A player representation P is a pair deﬁned as follows:
1. P ¼ ðh;NILÞ represents a player with time horizon h and modeling level 0.
2. Given a player representation O, with modeling level i 1 and time horizon q. Let hP q. Then P ¼ ðh;OÞ represents a
player with time horizon h and modeling level i.
When obvious from the context, we will use the term ’player’ rather than ’player representation’.
Thus, the simplest model, which is a level 0 model with time horizon 1 is denoted ð1;NILÞ; a ð2; ð1;NILÞÞmodel is a level 1
model in which P1 has time horizon 2 assuming that P2 is a level 0 model with time horizon 1; a ð3; ð2; ð1;NILÞÞÞ model is a
level 2 model in which P1 has time horizon 3 assuming that P2 is a level 1 model with time horizon 2 assuming that P1 is a
level 0 model with time horizon 1.
Fig. 2 shows how a ð2; ð2; ð1;NILÞÞÞmodel for P1 is represented as an ID. The leftmost ID represents the world as seen by P1.
In this ID, the nested model, namely ð2; ð1;NILÞÞ is used to ﬁll in the conditional probability distributions for the nodes M21
and M22 representing P
2’s decisions. The ID in the center represents this model, which represents the strategy assumed to be
played by P2. In this model, the conditional probability distributions forM11 andM
1
2 are found by analyzing the rightmost ID,
which represents the deepest model ð1;NILÞ. In the ð1;NILÞ model, the chance node M21 represents the completely random
strategy, which P2 is assumed to play on level 0.
Note that the leftmost ID in Fig. 2, contains extra arcs, namely the arc connecting the nodes M21 and M
2
2 and the arc con-
necting W0 and M
2
2. These arcs represent the extra information that (P
1 assumes that) P2 will have in time step 1 when P2 is
taking decision M22.Fig. 2. An ID representing the ð2; ð2; ð1;NILÞÞÞ model.
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t = 1. If the information is that the variables are in states w0;w1;m21, then P
2 can use the model to calculate PðA1jw0;w1;m21Þ.
Thus, when deciding for the current move, the player has to take into consideration that she – as well as the opponent – in
the future will learn and act accordingly.
The modeling of the learning opponent causes the dimensionality of the conditional probability table representing M2i to
grow heavily with the number of future world states. In this work we are addressing this problem.4. Finding optimal policies
As can be seen from Fig. 2 you start off with a simple ID (level 0) assuming P2 to play a random strategy regardless of her
assignment. This yields a policy for P1, which is a function ofW0 and A
1. This policy, d11 ðW0;A1Þ, is used as CPT for the next ID
representing P2’s decision problem (level 1). The solution of this ID is a pair of policies d21ðA2;W0Þ; d22ðA2;W0;M21;W1ÞÞ. Again,
these policies are entered as CPTs to the top ID (level 2). Actually, the process is a bit more complex. The ID is used for cal-
culating d21. However, when calculating the policy d
2
2 we have to take one more time slice into account. We shall return to this
point in the next section.
The resulting ID (level i) is a model which provides an optimal policy for the ﬁrst decision. When the players have made
their ﬁrst move, the model is also used to establish an updated distribution of the opponent’s assignment. P2 has also learned
from the ﬁrst move. For the example in Fig. 2, the level 0 player does not learn during moves, and the recursion stops here.
Next, the model is prepared to calculate an optimal policy for the second move. This is done by giving the nodes A2 and A1
new prior distributions corresponding to the updated beliefs from the ﬁrst moves. The level 1 ID now provides a new set of
policies, which are entered to the level 2 ID as CPTs, and the model is used again to suggest a ﬁrst decision (which in fact is
the player’s second move). The game continues so until some termination condition is met. Note that the model is always
used only for the ﬁrst decision in the model; the policies for the subsequent decisions are part of the player’s considerations
of future scenarios.4.1. Addressing the curse of time horizon
Assume that we are dealing with a ð3; ð2; ð1;NILÞÞ model. Then P1’s model contains four W-nodes and three nodes repre-
senting P2’s policies. Although P2 has a short time horizon, he has a long lasting memory, which he uses to provide a prob-
ability distribution over A1. This means that the policy for M23 has the domain ðW0;M21;W1;M22;W2;A2Þ, and we have a
complexity problem. Alas, the complexity problem is even worse. When calculating d23; P
1 not only has to take care of the
large space of possible past, she also has to include that P2 will plan one time step ahead.
Fig. 3 represents the ID, which P1 has to solve in order to estimate d23. Note that it contains a representation of P
1’s policies.
However, as P1 expects P2 to expect P1 to expect P2 to move completely randomly regardless of his assignment, P2 will act as
if P1 does not learn from the past.
The IDs for estimating d22 and d
2
1 are shown in Figs. 4 and 5.M23
W3 M24 W4
U23
U24
W0 W1
M11
W2
M12
A2
M13
M14
M21
M22
A1
Fig. 3. P1’s model of P2 for calculating d23 in a ð3; ð2; ð1;NILÞÞÞ model. The last two utility nodes for P2 are included. The policy for M23 has the domain
ðW0;M21;W1;M22;W2;A2), and the policy for M24 has the domain ðW0;M21;W1;M22;W2;M23;W3;A2).
M22
W2
M23 W3
U22
U23
W0 W1
M11
M12
A2
M13
M21
A1
Fig. 4. P1’s model of P2 for calculating d22 in a ð3; ð2; ð1;NILÞÞÞ model.
M21
W1
M11
M22
W2
U21
U22
W0
M12
A2
A1
Fig. 5. P1’s model of P2 for calculating d21 in a ð3; ð2; ð1;NILÞÞÞ model.
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2
4 are very large, we look for shorter representations approx-
imating them. There are in principle two ways; information enhancement: P1 assumes that P2 is more informed than he actu-
ally is at that state, and information reduction: she assumes that he is less informed.4.1.1. Information enhancement
As the past information is used to estimate the opponent’s assignment, P2 will be most informed, if he knows P1’s assign-
ment. If P1 assumes that P2 will know A1 after two moves, then the ID in Fig. 3 is transformed to the ID in Fig. 6.
Although it seems to increase complexity it does not. A standard structural analysis ([9,10]) shows that W0;M
2
1;W1;M
2
2
are irrelevant for the decision M23, and W0;M
2
1;W1;M
2
2;W2;M
2
3 are irrelevant for M
2
4. This yields the approximated policies
d^23ðW2;A1;A2Þ and d^24ðW3;A1;A2Þ, and it corresponds to determining the policy for the ﬁrst decision in the ID in Fig. 7.
The same approximation method can be used for M23 in Fig. 4.
Now, the optimal policies determined from the IDs in Figs. 6, 4 and 5 are used as conditional probability tables in the ID
for P1. This is shown in Fig. 8.
Again, we are faced with the curse of time horizon: the policy for M13 has a too large domain. Using information enhance-
ment, P1 will assume that, when she makes her third move, she will know P2’s assignment. This yields the ID in Fig. 9.
Again, structural analysis yields that W0;M
1
1;W1 and M
1
2 are irrelevant.4.1.2. Information reduction
An example of information reduction is LIMIDs [3], where you simply remove some variables from the domain.
Syntactically, LIMIDs are like IDs with the only difference that no-forgetting is not assumed and information is repre-
sented directly as information links.
For SSBGs it holds that the variables ðWi1;Mi;WiÞ in combination provides information about the opponent’s assign-
ment. Therefore, in our framework, the memory is characterized by how many sets of these combinations are remembered.
Hence we deﬁne a LIMID player representation as a player, which remembers a certain amount of time slices back. Like a
regular player from Deﬁnition 1 a LIMID player representation has a time horizon and a model of the opponent. However,
the LIMID player representation also has a constrained memory. If P1 is a LIMID player representation with memory m, she
will at decision P1i remember her previousmmovesM
1
im; . . . ;M
1
i1, together with the previousmworld statesWim; . . . ;Wi1.
M23
W3
M24 W4
U23
U24
W0 W1
M11
W2
M12
A2
M13
M14
M21
M22
A1
Fig. 6. Due to the link from A1 to M23, the nodes W0;M
2
1;W1;M
2
2 become irrelevant, and the domain of d^
2
3 is ðW2;A1;A2Þ. The link from A1 to M24 reduces the
domain of d^24 to ðW3;A1;A2Þ.
M23
W3
M24
W4
U23
U24
W2
M13
M14
A2
A1
Fig. 7. The ID for determining the policies d^23ðW2;A1;A2Þ and d^24ðW3;A1;A2Þ in Fig. 6.
M11
W1
M12
W2
M13
W3 U13W0
M21
M22 M23
A2
A1
Fig. 8. The ID for P1, where the last policy for P2 is simpliﬁed through information enhancement.
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M11
W1 M12
W2
M13
W3 U13
W0
M21 M22
M23
A2
A1
Fig. 9. The link from A2 to M
1
3 reduces the domain of d^
1
3 to ðW2;A1;A2Þ.
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2. Given a player representation or a LIMID player representation O, with modeling level i 1 and time horizon q. Let hP q.
P ¼ ðh;m;OÞ represents a LIMID player with time horizon h, memory m, and modeling level i.
The second entry allows LIMID players to assume that their opponents are ordinary players.
[3] describe a solution algorithm for solving LIMIDS called single policy updating. Single policy updating is an iterative
algorithm, which is guaranteed to converge towards a local optimum policy.
Another approach is to introduce dummy variables holding extracts of the information variables. As mentioned earlier, for
SSBGs the past is used to estimate the probability distribution over the opponent’s assignments. So we look for an efﬁcient
way of extracting important information about this distribution. This is best illustrated by using the LIMID speciﬁcation (all
information links must be explicit). Fig. 10 shows the ID from Fig. 4 in LIMID speciﬁcation.
For each set of nodes ðWi1;M2i ;WiÞ we may introduce a node representing what may be learned about P1’s assignment.
What has been learned from the various time slices is collected in a conclusion. As an information reducing approximation,
we assume that only the conclusion is observed (see Fig. 11).
The L-nodes may hold information on possible assignments. Then L has a state for each set of assignments, and the con-
clusion node represents set intersection. There is a risk of combinatorial explosion, though, as the number of states in the L-M22
M23
W2
W3
U22
U23
W0
W1
M11
M12
A2
M13
M21
A1
Fig. 10. P1’s model of P2 for calculating d22. All information is explicit through links.
M22
W2
L2
M23
W3
U22
U23
W0
W1
M11
L1
M12
A2
M13
M21
A1
Conc
Fig. 11. Fig. 10 extended with nodes representing what has been learned. No-forgetting is not assumed.
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there are at most two possible assignments left, or whether up to two assignments are deemed impossible.
It should be restated at this point that the approximating policies are not used directly by the players. They are only used
when considering what will happen in the future.
5. Experimental results
To perform empirical experiments with the methods proposed here we have implemented a simple board gamewhich we
call Grid. Grid is an SSBG. The board is an m n grid. There is exactly one piece on the board. In each turn, the players move
simultaneously the piece from one cell to another.
Initially, both players are randomly given an assignment, which is a pay-off function for the positions in the grid. In each
turn the players observe the position of the piece and decide to move it either up, down, right or left, (N; S; E and W). The
effect on the piece is a combination of the two players’ moves. If both actions can be carried out (i.e. the resulting position
of the piece is still inside the m n grid), the piece is ﬁrst moved to the neighboring cell in the direction of P1’s decision and
then to the neighboring cell in the direction of P2’s decision. If one of the actions cannot be carried out, the other action is
carried out (if possible). The s function adds noise to each player’s decision; when the decision is taken, there is a probability
that the game will act as if the player moved the piece left relative to the intended direction. For instance, if the player moves
N it will with probability 0.2 be read as a W.
When the piece is in its new position, the players are rewarded according to their assignment and the next turn begins.
The game is a zero-sum game so P1 is deducted what P2 wins and vice versa. This is obtained by subtracting P2’s pay-off from
P1’s pay-off and vice versa. The game has an unbounded time horizon, but it is interrupted after a predetermined number of
turns.
In our experiments we have chosen a 4 2 board with ﬁve possible assignments. The game together with the assign-
ments are shown in Fig. 12.
As an example, let player P1 and P2 get Assignment 3 and Assignment 1, respectively. In the ﬁrst move, (after taking the
noise added by s into account) P1’s move is read as N while P2’s move is read as W. From the resulting new state, P1 gets the
pay-off 5 while P2 gets the pay-off -1. Now the scores are 5 1 ¼ 6 to P1 and 1 5 ¼ 6 to P2. In the second move P1’s
move is read as N while P2’s move is read as S in which case the board state is not changed. The scores are now 12 to P1 and
12 to P2.
5.1. Memory usage
In the ﬁrst experiments we have investigated the memory required to construct the player’s model and the memory re-
quired to represent the player’s model. The memory required by a player is proportional to the memory required when the
player’s model has been compiled into a junction tree. Therefore, to measure the memory requirements, we measure the size
of the constructed junction tree for the model’s inﬂuence diagrams ([6]). Here, we shall refer to the size of a junction tree as
the number of cells in all cliques in the junction tree. The results are shown in Table 1. The 3rd column shows the size of the
junction tree of the top level inﬂuence diagram used by the model. This model, however, is not sufﬁcient for the model to be
useful for playing Grid. As has been pointed out in the previous section, it is necessary to estimate the opponent’s policy,
which is done by solving a number of IDs representing his policy. The model (2,(2,(1,NIL))) for instance, uses (2,(1,NIL)) to
estimate P2’s policy in M21 and a model resembling (3,(1,NIL)) to estimate P
2’s policy in M22 and ﬁnally the (1,NIL) model
Fig. 12. An example of the game Grid. In the ﬁrst move, P1 chooses to move N while P2 chooses to move W. In the second turn, P1 and P2 moves N and S,
respectively, canceling each other’s effect.
Table 1
Player models and the corresponding sizes of the required junction tree.
Model Top level model Sum of required models
1 (1,NIL) 2559 2559
2 (2,(1,NIL)) 22,190 24,749
3 (3,(1,NIL)) 511,827 514,386
4 (4,(1,NIL)) 16,079,864 16,082,423
5 (2,(2,(1,NIL))) 30,217 544,603
6 (3,(2,(1,NIL))) 1,012,406 17,628,846
7 (3,(3,(1,NIL))) 1,012,406 531,763,357
8 (4,(2,(1,NIL))) 37,560,163 568,333,304
9 (2,0,(1,NIL)) 7150 9709
10 (3,(2,0,(1,NIL))) 511,827 549,609
11 (4,(2,0,(1,NIL))) 16,079,864 16,138,569
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required in order to construct the top level model.
The results in Table 1 further motivates the need for approximated models for solving SSBGs. The simpliﬁed models in
rows 9, 10, 11 are based on LIMID players and require signiﬁcant less memory than their complete memory counterparts.
5.2. Performance of LIMID players compared to regular players
In a second experiment we measure how well player P1 with the approximated models plays Grid against P2 playing with
a (2,(1,NIL)) model. We compare these results with how well P1 performs with an exact model. In all the models we shall
assume that P1 has the correct model of P2, namely (2,(1,NIL)). We shall let P1 use the approximated models presented in
this paper. That is, P1 will play with our proposed approximations of the (3,(2,(1,NIL))) model. We will denote with
(3,(2,(1,NIL)))* a model that uses information enhancement when P1 estimates the opponent’s policy in M23, i.e. she uses
the model in Fig. 8. Also, (3,(2,(1,NIL)))** denotes a model where P1 uses information enhancement when she estimates
P2’s policy in M23 and assumes that she knows his assignment when she decides M
1
3, i.e. the model in Fig. 9.
(3,(2,(1,NIL))) is a model where P1 uses information reduction when she estimates P2’s policy in M23. More speciﬁcally,
she assumes that when P2 ﬁnds his policy in M22 he has limited memory and remembers only the previous world state
and his previous decision (see Fig. 10). (3,(2,(1,NIL))) makes the same assumptions with one addition, namely that also
P1 has limited her memory to the previous time slice in its 2nd decision.
It is likely that some combinations of assignments give one of the players an advantage. So, in stead of assigning the
assignments to the players randomly we assign the assignment such that all combinations of assignments have been played
the same number of times. In each experiment we let P1 and P2 play 200 games of each 10 moves. The results are summa-
rized in Table 2. The column marked P1 is P1’s average score per game. Notice that a positive number under P1 means that on
average P1 has scored more than P2. r is the standard deviation of the scores and ’total size’ is the total size of the required
junction trees for the particular model.
As expected, the most advanced model performs best (row 1). But this model also has the highest memory requirements.
The proposed approximations also gain positive scores with a signiﬁcantly smaller amount of memory required. It is difﬁcult
to explain why the model (3,(2,(1,NIL)))* seems to perform worse than the simpler model (3,(2,(1,NIL)))**.
Table 2
Average scores and standard deviations (r) after 200 Grid games between P1 playing with different models against P2 playing with a (2,(1,NIL)) model.
(3,(2,(1,NIL)))* uses information enhancement to estimate the opponent’s policy in M23 whereas (3,(2,(1,NIL)))
 uses information reduction to estimate the
opponent’s policy in M23. For (3,(2,(1,NIL)))
 and (3,(2,(1,NIL)))** see the text below.
Model P1 r Total size
1 (3,(2,(1,NIL))) 22.4 29.3 17,628,846
2 (3,(2,(1,NIL)))* 4.8 23.9 903,108
3 (3,(2,(1,NIL))) 9.9 21.9 1,065,801
4 (3,(2,(1,NIL)))** 7.2 23.3 580,161
5 (3,(2,(1,NIL))) 9.6 20.6 578,534
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enhancement (*).
5.3. Comparison of players of different levels
In a third experiment we have investigated what happens if P1 has overestimated or underestimated P2’s modeling level.
We have chosen to do this experiment based on LIMID Players. At level 0 we will use a model with horizon 1, but we will use
models with time horizon 2 and memory 2 on all levels above 0. So, when we investigate what happens when P1 plays with a
level 2 model against P2 with a level 0 model P1 will use (2,2,(2,2,(1,NIL))) while P2 will use a (1,NIL) model. In this example
P1 has overestimated P2’s modeling level since P1 has assumed P2 to have a (2,2,(1,NIL)) model while he really has a (1,NIL)
model. Moreover, P2 can be said to underestimate P1 because P2 expects P1 to use a (1,NIL) model while she really is using a
(2,2,(2,2,(1,NIL))) model.
The results for P1 with levels 1–7 against P2 with levels 0 through 6 are shown in Table 3.
The numbers in the cells refer to the score of player P1, i.e. in the ﬁrst row, the (2,2,(1,NIL)) has scored on average 18.5
points in games against (1,NIL) who has scored on average 18.5. Each score is the average score of at least 50 games of each
10 moves. Standard deviations on the game outcomes are shown in italics. As expected, players win when they have the cor-
rect assumptions about the opponent, whereas it is likely to cause a disaster if P1 over estimates P2. For instance, with a level
7 model (row 7), P1 wins only if P2 is a level 6 player (which she assumes he is) or when P2 is a level 2 player. In all the rest of
the cases P1 looses. Hence it seems not to be an advantage to overestimate the opponent.
If we look at the results in the eyes of P2 we can see the consequences of underestimating the opponent. For instance, in
the column labeled ‘1’, P2 is playing with a level 1 model assuming P1 to be level 0, whereas P1 is really playing with models
of levels 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7. P2 is loosing when P1 has the correct model of him as a level 2 player and when P1 is playing as a
level 6 player. When P2 is using a level 2 model he is winning only if P1 is playing as a level 6 player. Overall it seems to be a
disadvantage to underestimate the opponent.6. Related work and conclusions
As we have already brieﬂy outlined, we are not the ﬁrst to address how multiple agents reason about other agent’s rea-
soning. Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs) have been extended to multi-agent scenarios. These
extensions can be divided into two groups, objective and subjective approaches.Table 3
Average scores and standard deviations (italics) obtained by players with h ¼ 2 on different levels in a 4 2 instance of grid.
Level 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 18.5 – – – – – –
24.8 – – – – – –
2 0.375 20.8 – – – – –
29.27 33.0 – – – – –
3 11.76 14.5 11.5 – – – –
41.1 36.8 37.8 – – – –
4 7.92 14.4 13.8 13.8 – – –
36.2 39.9 36.9 25.9 – – –
5 8.64 2.4 0.24 0.96 12.24 – –
36.9 35.2 18.9 11.8 34.5 – –
6 4.68 6.24 1.92 6.72 11.5 13.3 –
33.7 31.2 25.8 36.1 33.9 27.6 –
7 6.48 15.24 7.8 12.7 16.3 2.52 9.12
42.1 33.9 28.6 28.5 40.1 26.9 25.8
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In this line of work we ﬁnd stochastic games (or Markov games) [13]. They base their solution on Nash Equilibria (or more
speciﬁcally Markov perfect equilibria or Bayesian Equilibria). These are equilibria derived from situations when all agents can
be assumed to be equally informed about the game and when all players play completely rational. Bernstein et al. [14] pro-
posed decentralized POMDPs (DEC-POMDPs) in which all agents share the same reward function i.e. the environment is coop-
erative. DEC-POMDPs suffer from notorious complexity problems and much work is currently being done addressing this
issue (e.g. [15], [16] and many more). Moreover, DEC-POMDPs calculate one overall policy which, when found, must be dis-
tributed among the agents in the scenario. Critics of Objective approaches argue that they rely on the unrealistic assumption
that all agents are equally informed about the game. Furthermore, in a Nash equilibrium, each agent will be indifferent about
the various possible non-dominated actions as long as the other agents stick to their policies. Therefore, there is a problem of
non-uniqueness and a problem of incompleteness. Non-uniqueness: there may be more than one equilibrium, and if so, the
agent is still indifferent about which action he should choose. Incompleteness: in case there is evidence that the other agent
deviates from the equilibrium strategy the ﬁrst agent is still indifferent about the non-dominated actions.
Subjective approaches, on the contrary, focus on an individual agent’s modeling of the environment and other agents and
perform decision-theoretic reasoning from his perspective. Gmytrasiewicz and Durfee [17], propose a subjective approach.
They propose the Recursive Modeling Method (RMM) in which they model an agent as a rational agent equipped with models
of the other agents. The other agents are also assumed to be rational and they in turn may also be equipped with models of
the other agents (including the ﬁrst agent). Eventually the recursive modeling will be terminated by a ‘‘No information”
model which does not have models of the other agents.
Gmytrasiewicz and Doshi [2] have proposed the Interactive POMDP (IPOMDP) which is a POMDP method that has
emerged from RMM. In an IPOMDP the agent has to reason about the world and the other agents in a structure called an
interactive state. The interactive state contains the actual state of the world and belief over the other agent’s interactive
states. The concept of interactive states coincides with Harsanyi’s type [18]. A type encloses the player’s belief of the true
world state, his preferences (utility function) and his belief of the other players’ types. This, in turn, includes their prefer-
ences and their beliefs of his beliefs and his preferences etc. Not surprisingly, IPOMDPs (like DEC-POMDPs) suffer from noto-
rious complexity problems. Speciﬁcally, IPOMDPs suffer from the curse of dimensionality (the complexity of the belief
representation) and the curse of time horizon. Finding ways for better scalability in IPOMDPs is an important research topic.
Doshi and Gmytrasiewicz [19], for instance, address both complexity issues. They apply a particle ﬁlter for addressing the
curse of dimensionality and a they sample a look-ahead tree for addressing the curse of time horizon. While Monte-Carlo
methods often turn out to provide efﬁcient solutions in many areas they still rely on sampling from a domain which may
be overly complex. If, however, it would be possible to identify redundant information and in a novel way simplify the ori-
ginal models, all techniques (including Monte-Carlo techniques) would beneﬁt from that.
Therefore, we have investigated the possibility of expressing multi-agent interaction in the language of inﬂuence dia-
grams (IDs). IDs decompose the situation into multiple chance and decision variables and they allow to use the conditional
independence between the variables for a less memory consuming representation. Suryadi and Gmytrasiewicz [20] proposed
a simple way to model the interaction of multiple agents using inﬂuence diagrams. This work, however, modeled the oppo-
nent’s policies as probability distributions depending on the past in the game and did no effort in performing a particular
modeling of the other agents.
Also Koller and Milch [8] have proposed the Multi-Agent inﬂuence diagram (MAID) and more recently Gal and Pfeffer [21]
have proposed Networks of Inﬂuence diagrams (NIDs) which are based on MAIDs. However, they focus on calculating equi-
librium solutions.
Polich and Gmytrasiewicz [22] propose an inﬂuence diagram framework which avoids the equilibrium solutions by
extending the IPOMDP framework and propose the interactive dynamic inﬂuence diagram (I-DID). I-DIDs introduce a new type
of node to the ID language, namely the modeling node. A Modeling node contains the agent’s models of other agent’s which
in turn may be other I-DIDs. Thus, the modeling node and the nodes representing the actual world states (in each time slice)
constitute the agent’s interactive state. I-DIDs suffer from the same complexity issues as IPOMDPs and currently much work
is going on addressing this issue. Recently, Doshi et al. [23] in particular address the curse of time horizon by reducing the
dimensionality of the state space through conjecturing that models with spatially close beliefs are likely to be behaviorally
equivalent. They cluster the possible opponent models into clusters of similar models using k-means and keep k models.
More recently, Zeng and Doshi [24] have proposed an exact method that reduces the model space in two steps. First they
identify behaviorally equivalent models by analyzing the models’ policy trees and merge them together into a single policy
graph. Secondly they group together, at each time step, the models with equivalent actions into action equivalence classes.
Despite, still having to keep track of the different possible player models inside each action equivalence class, the approach
reduces complexity because only the equivalence classes need to be represented in the modeling nodes.
The work in the present paper resembles the work done in the I-DID framework. We use dynamic inﬂuence diagrams for
modeling the agent’s subjective decision-theoretic reasoning and its reasoning about other agent’s reasoning. We take outset
in the MAID representation framework, but we do not assume the players to be completely rational. That is, we assume them
to have a limited analysis depth and a limited time horizon in their reasoning. This makes it possible to build inﬂuence dia-
grams representing the opponent’s policy directly as a chance node. Our work also suffers from complexity issues. We show
different ways to address the curse of time horizon in the models by either removing arcs or adding arcs in the inﬂuence
diagrams. When removing arcs we use limited memory inﬂuence diagrams (LIMIDs) which were proposed by Lauritzen
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agent is fully informed at some point in the future) which was proposed by Jensen [25]. It turns out that these methods
can signiﬁcantly reduce the amount of memory required to represent the models.
We have left an important point untouched: before a game begins a player rarely knows how intelligent the opponent is.
It should be possible to adapt to the opponent’s level of intelligence during play. It is likely that due to the relative success of
the models that underestimated the opponent, it is possible to beat a player at any level with adaptation. A simple indication
of wrong modeling is given when P2 makes a move, which is impossible according to the model. For the current experiments
we have chosen to keep the model and instead change the belief of the opponent’s assignment. When a 0 probability is ob-
served the player’s belief of the opponent’s assignment is perturbed slightly such that all assignment which were previously
deemed impossible, are assigned a non zero probability in the player’s belief. We plan to address this problem in future re-
search in order to exploit inconsistence between models and observations for choosing correct models of the opponent.
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